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By Stephanie M. Wildman
he California Supreme Court
recently decided two companion
cases concerning assumption of
, a common law tort defense. The
isions do not signal a major theoretchange in tort law in California,
ply some new vocabulary applied
existing concepts. However, the
ication by the court of this new
bulary to the facts of these cases
mark a radical departure from the
itional analysis of duty of care
d by a negligent defendant to an
red plaintiff. The different views
by the litigants and judges of the
in these cases suggest the imporof a continuing role for the jury
tort adjudication.
In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.
296 and Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3
. 4th 339, the court considered
ther the classic tort defense of
lied assumption of a reasonable
had survived in California after the
tion of comparative fault with Li
ellow Cab (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804.
the supreme court eradicated
ption of risk as a separate neglie defense "to the extent it is merevariant of the former doctrine of
butory negligence." Li at 825.
The aspect of implied assumption
risk that had been abolished in Li
ed to involve assumption by
iff of an unreasonable risk, such
cepting a ride home from an obvidrunk driver. See, ~., Gonzalez
ia, 75 Cal.App. 3d 874, 142 Cal.
03 (1977) (plaintiff accepting
When alternatives such as calling a

cab or asking wife to come pick him
up, were readily available). Such conduct by a plaintiff, encountering a risk
that is unreasonable in relation to his or
her own safety, is contributorily negligent. After Li, the question remained
whether any part of the doctrine of
implied assumption of risk endured.
The doctrine is commonly misconstrued. A pedestrian who dashes across
the middle of a busy street, trying to
beat the oncoming cars, is not assuming the risk of the drivers' negligence.
(A much used torts hornbook, W.P.
Keeton, D. Dobbs,R. Keeton, & D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts
(5th ed. 1984) uses a similar example
at 484-85.) In fact the pedestrian is
assuming that the drivers will be extra
careful and alert, slowing down when
they see someone crossing illegally.
The pedestrian's conduct can be char-

acterized as taking a risk, possibly a
negligent one, but not as assumption of
risk.
Assumption of risk is traditionally
tested on a subjective basis. Gonzalez,
supra, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 878. Assumption of risk must be voluntary. Prescott
v. Ralph's Grocery Co. (1954) 42Cal.
2d 158, 162, Restatement (Second) of
Torts 496E ( 1965). Defendant must
show that plaintiff knew of the risk and
willingly took it. Assumption of risk is
the "voluntary acceptance of a risk
[where] such acceptance ... has been
made with knowledge and appreciation
of the risk." Prescott, supra, 42 Cal. 2d
at 161-62.
Under assumption of risk, plaintiff
is implicitly agreeing to a defendant's
use of less than reasonable care toward
him or her. For plaintiff to assume a
risk, plaintiff must be aware both of
that specific risk, not just of general
danger, and of the degree or magnitude
of that risk. Thus, a plaintiff theoretically might agree, voluntarily and
knowingly, to assume an unreasonable
or a reasonable risk. As noted, the
defense of assumption of an unreasonable risk was merged into comparative
fault. In Knight and Ford, the California Supreme Court had promised to
resolve the question whether the
defense of implied assumption of a reasonable risk remained a distinct part of
California tort law.
In Knight the court issued several
opinions, with no clear majority voice.
The Knight plurality decision, authored
by Justice George and joined by Jus-

tices Lucas and Arabian, acknowledged that assumption of risk has been
used in very dissimilar cases involving
"analytically different legal concepts."
Knight supra, 3 Cal.4th at 303. Those
different legal concepts included using
assumption of risk to describe either "a
reduction of defendants duty of care"
(Id. at 308) toward a a plaintiff or
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id.
at 307. As to the distinction between
reasonable and unreasonable assumption of risk, the court said that the distinction was "more misleading than
helpful." Id. at 309.
Thus the plurality drew a distinction between two historical uses of the
assumption of risk doctrine. The plu-

under the comparative fault framework, which might allow some tort
recovery.
Now every first year law student
studying hornbook tort law will tell
you that if the defendant owes no duty
toward the plaintiff to use reasonable
care then there is no prima facie case
of negligence and no tort liability.
Lawyers only concern themselves with
the question of defenses to negligence
once the prima facie case of tort liability has been established. So the court's
retention of primary assumption of risk
in California tort vocabulary means
that there is now another way for
defense counsel to argue that no duty is
owed to the plaintiff: defense counsel

rality differentiated "those instances in
which the assumption of risk doctrine
embodies a legal conclusion that there
is 'no duty' on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk ... and (2) those instances
in which the defendant does owe a duty
of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff
knowingly encounters a risk of injury
caused by the defendant's breach of
that duty." Id. at 308.
According to the court, the first
kind of assumption of risk, termed primary assumption of risk, is not merged
into comparative negligence. Thus a
plaintiff's recovery would be barred in
those cases. In the second sort of case,
involving secondary assumption of
risk, a plaintiff's conduct is analyzed

will say it is a case of primary assumption of risk.
It is unfortunate that the court chose
to retain this assumption of risk language, instead of relegating it to the
realm of tort defense, and to inject it
into the question of duty, the first issue
in analyzing the negligence prima facie
case. The court gave no elaboration on
how a judge should decide if a duty is
owed, using primary assumption of
risk. Presumably, using the language of
primary assumption of risk should not
warrant a different inquiry than is usually made by a judge on the duty question.
Justice Mosk, concurring and dissenting in Knight, provided the fourth
vote for affirming summary judgment

for the defendant. Evidently he thought.
that the duty inquiry made by the plu~
rality, whether called the duty element
of the prima facie case or primary
assumption of risk, led to the same
liability result. He urged the court
abolish the so-called defense and
reach the no duty conclusion using tra~
ditional tort analysis. By abolishing
doctrine of assumption of risk,
court could have avoided the c011rus1mf.;
that will be generated by calling
doctrine a defense, but applying it
part of the plaintiff's prima facie
In terms of tort theory, plaintiff
still show defendant owes her or him
duty to use reasonable care. No
may be viewed as a failure to prove
negligence prima facie case or may
called primary assumption of risk. If
duty is owed by defendant to 1-''""'UJ'"
then the negligence prima facie """·" .~~''"
must be analyzed, followed by
es, including comparative fault,
will include secondary assumption
risk.
Nothing has changed in theory,
except that a new name for the judicial
ruling "no duty of reasonable care
owed" has been added to California
law: "primary assumption of risk." Are
these cases, then, much ado about
nothing? Unfortunately they are not1
because it is in the application of
tort theory to the facts of these
that we see the radical change that has
been slipped into California law
these decisions. The situated nature of
the judicial decision about duty of
is veiled under a new layer of vocabu·
lary.
Generally when one engages in
activity, the actor has the duty to do
reasonably, using reasonable care
toward those with whom the actor
come into contact. Special duty
historically have arisen in cases of
ure to act, control of the conduct
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another, landowners and occupiers,
economic harm, and emotional harm.
These special duty cases have raised
question whether the defendant

the plaintiff a duty to use reasoncare toward his or her safety. But
ordinary behavior and social relaactors have the duty to act reaThis common law premise is
by statute in California in
Code 1714. As the Knight court
"As a general rule, persons have a
to use due care to avoid injury to
and may be held liable if their
.e<tre1ess conduct injures another per(See Civ. Code, 1714. )" Id. at 315.
In Knight the plaintiff's finger was
;;2;~uan:g1e:d during a touch football game.
three operations "failed to restore
movement in [plaintiff's] little finor to relieve the ongoing pain of
injury," the finger was amputated.
at 301.
Before the injury occurred, plaintiff
complained to defendant that he
playing too roughly.
at 300.
had said she would not continue
g unless he was more careful,
according to plaintiff, he had said
he would. Id. at 300. Defendant
0
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and plaintiff recalled the injury-causing
play differently. Defendant recalled
jumping to intercept a pass, missing the
ball, and colliding with plaintiff. As he
landed, he stepped backward onto
plaintiff's hand. Id. at 300. Plaintiff
and another participant, Starr, recalled
that Starr had caught the pass, and that
defendant ran into plaintiff from
behind, knocking her down. Defendant
then continued running until he tagged
Starr, injuring her as well. Id. at 30001.
The gender division between the litigants is striking in these different
views of the case.
The different
viewpoints held by the participants in
the injury-causing event provide a fascinating backdrop from which to view
the divergent viewpoints of the justices. By calling this case one of primary assumption of risk, the court is saying that this football playing defendant
owed no duty to use reasonable care
toward other players in the game for
the injuries that he caused. Yet Civil
Code 1714 states that as a general rule
persons have a duty to use due care to
avoid injury to others. The court's decision implies that recreational sports
participants are in a different category
regarding duty.
The three justice plurality seemed
very concerned with co-participants in
sports and how to ensure that players
should not be liable for every little
push and jostle that might lead to
injury. Justice Mosk agreed that no
duty owed was the correct analysis,
providing the fourth vote to affirm
summary judgment for the sports
defendant. We might call this the
"sports standard" - hang tough in
sports because no one owes you a duty
to use reasonable care in a rough game.
Recent academic writing has identified gendered, socialized differences in
how children play. See Carol Gilligan,
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In A Different Voice. The sports standard reflects this male gendered orientation.
This acceptance of a sports
standard makes an interesting contrast
to the views of the other justices. Justice Kennard, dissenting, found that a
duty to use reasonable care was owed
by the sports defendant. She analyzed
the case as one raising issues of knowledge and voluntary consent, which
classically are raised by an assumption
of risk defense. She believed that a trial
would be necessary to resolve the
issues. Two other justices, Baxter and
Panelli, agreed with the majority result,
no recovery for the injured player; but
would have arrived at that result using
the consent-based assumption of risk
analysis, finding that the injured player
had agreed to the defendant's using the
care of a football player toward her.
The female litigant's view that players
should act reasonably toward each

other, within the rules of the game and
that the defendant breached that duty is
not seen by most justices. Most justices
either scoff at the idea of co-participant
duty (the sports standard) or discount
the breach issue raised by the plaintiff's version of the facts. It remains to
be seen whether similar devaluation of
duty as articulated in Civil Code 1714
will occur outside the sports setting.

In Ford v. Gouin, supra, a gendered
view of the problem is not in evidence,
but a different serious issue emerges.
In that case, the plaintiff water-skier
was injured when he collided with an
overhanging tree limb while water-skiing barefoot and backwards. Ford
supra, 3 Cal.4th at 343. This conduct
probably could be termed foolhardy.
The court, in its application of Knight,

states that "the assumption of risk doctrine operates as a complete bar [when]
... the defendant's conduct did not
breach a legal duty of care owed to the
plaintiff." (Emphasis added) Ford at
342.
The Ford plurality purports to be
applying its newly articulated no-duty
owed standard from the Knight case,
yet the court says that its analysis is
about breach of duty. The question of
breach is traditionally one that is within the province of the jury in tort cases.
If the court is advocating using primary
assumption of risk, under the guise of
duty analysis, as a substitute for the
negligence determination historically
made by the trier of fact, that usurpation of jury function would be a radical
departure from traditional handling of

tort cases.
Implied assumption of a reasonable
risk remains a superfluous tort doctrine. A proper analysis of the existing
elements of the prima facie case of
negligence, duty, breach, actual cause,
and proximate cause, will result in a
fitting disposition of the case. In cases
where the plaintiff's conduct is at
issue, the existing tort doctrine of com-

parative fault provides an appropriate
vehicle for analyzing those issues.
The so-called defense of implied
assumption of a reasonable risk,
whether primary or secondary, is not
necessary to tort analysis. Assumption
of risk raises no arguments that are not
already served by other aspects of the
prima facie case of negligence. The
retention of the assumption of risk
defense results in doctrinal doublecounting, where litigants make repetitive arguments under different doctrinal names.
Hiding behind the language of "primary assumption of risk" courts may
be permitted to duck serious issues of
social obligation traditionally raised by
the duty issue, without doing the analysis necessary to reveal the decision-

making process. The evaluation
whether a duty is owed is within
province of the judge, but the
gence determination, if defendant does
owe plaintiff a duty, should be allowed
to the jury.
Traditionally the jury is called upon
to resolve cases upon which reasonable
people might differ. Reasonable men
and reasonable women often see the
same situation from very different perspectives. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924. ·
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (establishing
reasonable woman standard to evaluate
sexual harassment: "conduct that many
men consider unobjectionable may.
offend many women." Id. at 878.)
touch football game is another place
where gender differences might color a;
participant's or decisionmaker's view
of reality. Understanding that these:
gender differences exist would be
beneficial step toward greater fairness
in judging and in decisionmaking.
Cf.Catharine Wells, Situated Decisio~.
making, 63 S. Cal. Law Rev.1721
(1990). Obfuscating the issue of viewpoint with more doctrinal language,
such as primary assumption of risk,
will not bring us closer to our aspiration for justice.

Stephanie M. Wildman is a Profes~
sor of Law at the University of San
Francisco School of Law. Some of the
author's concerns about assumption
risk have been previously expressed
"Time to Abolish Implied Assumption
of a
Reasonable
Risk ltt
California" (co-authored with John C.
Barker), 25 U.S.F L.Rev. 647 (1991).
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